











This paper estimates the welfare loss caused by the violent deaths registered in 73 countries of the world during the 
nineties. A violence rate, and its distribution across age groups, determines a loss in life expectancy that can be valued 
using the marginal willingness to pay approach. Together with the age distribution of the population, the willingness to 
pay can be used to estimate the social value of violence reductions. The results show that violence reduces life 
expectancy at birth, on average, by one-third of a year. This represents a reduction in lifetime welfare corresponding to, 
on average, 15% of the 1995 GDP. In Colombia, homicide rates reduce life expectancy at birth by 2.2 years; in the US, 
by 0.3 year. The lifetime welfare cost of violence corresponds to 13 and 100% of, respectively, the American and 
Colombian aggregate GDP’s in 1995. Generally, one additional year of life lost to violence is associated with an 
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1 Introduction 
 
  This paper estimates the welfare loss caused by the violent deaths registered in 73 
countries of the world during the nineties. We use data on number of deaths by age group 
and cause of death from the World Health Organization to calculate the age-specific 
reduction in survival probabilities due to violence. We then apply the marginal 
willingness to pay approach suggested by the “value of life” literature, in order to 
estimate the monetary value of the reductions in survival probabilities for individuals at 
any given age. Together with the age distribution of the population, this willingness to 
pay can be used to estimate the social value of violence reductions, or the welfare cost of 
violence. Our results show that the reduction in life expectancy due to violence represents 
a substantial welfare loss, comparable in magnitude to the direct material costs of crime. 
  In the course of more than ten years of direct involvement of the United States in 
the Vietnamese conflict, roughly 58,000 American lives were lost. During the decade of 
the nineties, an average of more than 27,000 American lives were lost every year due to 
homicides, injuries purposely inflicted, and other forms of violence. Colombia, with a 
population more than seven times smaller than the American, lost to violence, on 
average, more than 28,000 lives in each year of that same decade. 
  It is difficult to imagine that such impressive numbers do not represent significant 
welfare losses, that go above and beyond the simple material costs and inefficiencies 
associated with crime. Material costs of crime and violence – including both direct costs 
and expenditures on criminal justice and crime prevention – have indeed been estimated 
to add up to a significant fraction of production across different regions of the world. This 
number is thought to be around 2.1% of the GDP per year for the US, and 3.6% for Latin 
America (see, for example, Bourguignon, 2000 and Londoño and Guerrero, 1999). Yet, 
introspection suggests that a large part of the welfare loss entailed by violence is related 
to the feeling of insecurity, or the exposure to the risk of victimization itself.  
  This paper draws on the “value of life” literature to estimate the non-monetary 
costs associated with the violence observed in different countries of the world. A given 
violence rate, and its distribution across different age groups, determines a loss in life 
expectancy that can be valued using the marginal willingness to pay approach suggested   2
by Schelling (1968), and developed in detail by Usher (1973) and Rosen (1988). 
Together with the age distribution of the population, the willingness to pay can be used to 
estimate the social value of violence reductions for any given country. The policy appeal 
of a number like this is obvious: it gives the sum of resources that a society is willing to 
spend in order to eliminate violence, taking into account only its effects on mortality. 
  The criminology literature has made numerous efforts to estimate different 
dimensions of the costs of crime and violence in the United States. The most common 
approach has been to try to infer costs of crime by looking at byproducts of differences in 
crime rates across different locations. This is the case of the strand of literature 
inaugurated by Thaler (1978), and with a recent example in Lynch and Rasmussen 
(2001), which uses differences in house prices across neighborhoods with different crime 
rates to infer the welfare costs of crime. In an analogous way, Hamermesh (1999) uses 
the differences in timing of work across different metropolitan areas to infer the 
inefficiencies and the social welfare loss generated by violence. Also, Cullen and Levitt 
(1999) hint at the social cost of crime when discussing the effect of crime on urban flight, 
but they do not estimate welfare loss or willingness to pay values. Most of these studies 
suggest that non-material costs of crime are probably of the same order of magnitude of 
material costs, and, therefore, are an important and often neglected dimension of the 
problem. 
  Other literature, exemplified by Cohen (1990) and Miller et al (1993) tries to 
estimate direct (material, medical, etc) and welfare costs of violence by bringing together 
several different sources. Material and medical costs are usually calculated using 
National Crime Survey and Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates. Welfare losses from 
exposure to the risk of victimization are obtained either by multiplying the probability of 
death by the “value of a statistical life,” or by using jury awards, determined for accidents 
with consequences similar to crimes (see Cohen, 1990). 
More recently, a promising literature, which uses the “contingent-valuation” 
approach suggested originally for the evaluation of environmental policies, has emerged. 
Cook and Ludwig (2000), Ludwig and Cook (2001), and Cohen et al (2004) are examples 
of this line of research. The contingent-valuation method is based on surveys asking 
individuals’ about their choices over alternative policies. The answers to these surveys   3
are then used to estimate the individual and social willingness to pay for policies targeted 
at a specific type of crime or violence.   
  Though there is a vast literature in all these areas, it is almost exclusively 
restricted to the US case. From an international perspective, virtually no work has been 
done on the non-monetary costs of crime and violence. To our knowledge, the only 
exceptions are the work of Bourguignon (2000) and Londoño and Guerrero (1999). 
Bourguignon (2000) is mainly interested in the effects of crime and violence on 
development and inequality. While analyzing the effect of crime on welfare inequality, he 
presents raw estimates of the monetary costs of violence for the United States and Latin 
America as a whole. Additionally, he also estimates non-monetary costs related to the 
pain from victimization (from jury awards) and the loss of human capital. Nevertheless, 
in reality, several of the statistics presented for Latin America are indirectly obtained via 
extrapolation of US numbers (using an income-proportionality assumption). The author 
acknowledges the limitation of his numbers, and stresses the tentative nature of the 
analysis. Londoño and Guerrero (1999) also present estimates for Latin America as a 
whole and some statistics for selected countries based on case studies (Brazil, Colombia, 
El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela). 
  This paper presents the first set of comprehensive cross-country estimates of non-
monetary costs of crime. Methodologically, it also represents the first attempt to use the 
“value of life” methodology in this context in order to estimate the social value of 
violence reductions. 
  We use age and cause specific number of deaths in 1995 to simulate the age 
specific mortality rates that would be observed in a given country in the absence of 
violence. This does not reflect the optimal reduction in violence, and it does not even 
imply that eradication of violence is possible. It just reflects the loss in well being from 
existing violence levels. These mortality rates correspond to hypothetical survival 
probabilities that add up to a life expectancy higher than the one actually observed in 
1995. The “value of life” approach allows us to estimate how much individuals at 
different ages would be willing to pay for the change in survival probabilities determined 
from the reduction in violence. With the age distribution of the population, we can   4
aggregate the willingness to pay to obtain the social value of violence eradication, or, in 
other words, the welfare cost of violence. 
  Our results show that, in the extreme case of Colombia, violence determines a 
reduction of 2.2 years in life expectancy at birth. For the US, violence reduces life 
expectancy at birth by 0.3 year, while for Western Europe the average reduction is 0.1 
year. The value of such changes in life expectancy is quite significant, and even more so 
once one realizes the social aspect of violence. If we assume that all the population of 
each country can enjoy the ensuing mortality reductions, the present lifetime social value 
of eliminating violence corresponds to 13% of the American GDP in 1995, and 100% of 
the Colombian GDP in that same year. In Western Europe, the average present lifetime 
social value of violence eradication corresponds to 5% of the 1995 GDP. Generally, a 
one-unit increase in the years of life lost to violence is associated with an increase of 44% 
of the GDP in the lifetime social willingness to pay for violence reductions. 
  These results give the welfare loss determined by the increased mortality rates 
induced by violence. There are several other costs of violence that are not incorporated 
into the analysis, and that should be added to the numbers we obtain. Material costs, such 
as the ones discussed in the first paragraphs of the introduction, and inefficiencies 
associated to changes in behavior induced by crime and violence, are not addressed in the 
paper (on the latter, see studies discussed in Merlo, 2004). Nevertheless, we do provide 
estimates for a large number of countries on the cost of violence on one very important 
welfare dimension, namely, mortality. The evidence supports the belief that non-
monetary costs of violence and crime are as important as material costs. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the 
theoretical framework used in the valuation of reductions in mortality rates, and discusses 
the parameterization of the model. Section 3 discusses the data used, and the construction 
of the counterfactual survival probabilities that would be observed in the absence of 
violence. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 illustrates, with the case 
of Brazil, the potential implications of incorporating inequalities in income and 
victimization into the analysis. Section 6 summarizes the main results of the paper, and 
points out its limitations and policy implications. 
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2 The Valuation of Reductions in Violence 
 
Violence, as reflected in death rates, has effects on mortality across different age 
groups of a given society. Mortality due to violence reduces survival probabilities 
throughout the survival distribution, and has a final cumulative effect that is reflected on 
a reduced life expectancy at birth. In section 3, we discuss how we simulate the survival 
probabilities that would be observed in the absence of violence. Now, we develop the 
tools that will be used to value a given change in survival probabilities. 
Define S(t,a) as the probability of survival to age t of an individual currently at 
age a. Assume that some exogenous factor v (as in violence) affects the survival function, 
so that we can write S(t,a;v). Exogenous changes in v shift the survival function 
according to ∂S(t,a;v)/∂v. To save on notation, we define Sv(t,a) = ∂S(t,a;v)/∂v. Our 
goal is to give monetary values to Sv(t,a). 
 
2.1 Theory 
Following Rosen (1988), consider an individual at age a facing survival 
probabilities up to age t given by the survival function S(t,a). Lifetime discounted utility 
at age a can be written as: 
 




dt t c u a t S a t e a U ρ         ( 1 )  
 
where c(t) is consumption at t, and ρ is the rate of time preference. This formulation 
implicitly assumes that utility on the “death state” is normalized to zero (for a detailed 
discussion, see Rosen, 1988). Assume a complete contingent claims market, such that the 
individual’s budget constraint is given by 
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where  y(t) is income at age t, and r is the interest rate. Rather than realism, this 
assumption appeals to the tractability of the problem. 
First order conditions for the agent’s optimum imply that 
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 for every t, where λa is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint for an individual at 
age a. 
Using the envelope theorem, the marginal willingness to pay for changes in S(t,a), 
brought about by changes in v, is defined as: 
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Rearranging terms and using the first order conditions: 
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Defining  ε(c(t)) as the elasticity of the instantaneous utility function u(.) in 
relation to its argument (evaluated at c(t)), we can rewrite this expression as: 
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This expression summarizes the main determinants of the willingness to pay for 
changes in survival probabilities. Discounting of the future implies that individuals will 
be willing to pay more for given mortality reductions the closer they are to the moment   7
where the largest changes in survival probabilities take place. From a social perspective, 
the population distribution will be important because it will determine the weight 
attributed to mortality reductions at each given age, according to the size of the 
population that is immediately affected by it. 
In addition, income and consumption throughout life will also determine the value 
of changes in survival probabilities. The higher consumption is at a point in time, the 
higher the direct utility gain (c(t)/ε(c(t))) from increasing the probability of survival up to 
that moment. Similarly, the higher the income surplus from a given period that can be 
used to “subsidize” consumption in other periods is (y(t) – c(t)), the higher the value of 
increasing the probability of survival up to that moment. In short, the value of surviving 
up to a given moment is determined by the utility directly enjoyed in that moment and by 
the income surplus generated in that moment that can be used to increase utility in other 
periods. These are the two factors inside brackets in expression (5). 
Expression (5) can be used to evaluate the welfare gains from given reductions in 
mortality rates for an individual at any age a. With this expression, the social value is 
obtained by integrating MWPa through all ages, weighting the value at each age by the 
population in the respective age group. If the population P of a country is distributed 
across ages according to the density function f(.), the social value of changes in survival 
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This is the sum of the willingness to pay of every individual in society. Equation 
(6) is analogous to the one that characterizes the optimal provision of a continuous public 
good in the traditional public finance literature. 
In this general formulation, the calculation of the marginal willingness to pay for 
changes in survival probabilities requires data on income and consumption at every point 
in time. In a cross-country context, these data are not available for the vast majority of 
                                                 
1 This formula does not incorporate the value to future generations of the reductions in violence. Therefore, 
also from this perspective, our numbers should be seen as conservative estimates of the social lifetime 
present value of the welfare costs of violence.   8
cases. When the main goal is the comparison of lifetime welfare levels and changes, a 
feasible alternative is to abstract from lifecycle considerations by assuming that ρ = r and 
y(t) is constant (y(t) = y). This allows the calculation of values of changes in mortality 
rates using only national income figures widely available (GDP per capita as y). With 
these assumptions, first order conditions imply that c(t) is also constant, such that we can 
write c(t) = c = y, and MWPa can be expressed as 
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The interpretation of MWPa in this context is straightforward. For a given country 
at a point in time, it tells us how much an individual at age a, earning the average income 
of the country in every period of life, would be willing to pay for the changes in survival 
probabilities summarized by Sv(t,a). We come back to the limitations imposed by this 
assumption in Section 5. 
In the simple case where individuals live for a deterministic amount of time (τ), 
and all life expectancy gains are concentrated in the last period of life, this expression 
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Though we will not make use of this simple version of the model in our analysis, 
it illustrates the two main determinants of the value of reductions in mortality: the value 
of income throughout life (fraction term), and the size and moment of the reductions in 
mortality (term multiplying the fraction). Countries with higher income attach more value 
to given longevity gains, since marginal extensions in life expectancy are more valuable 
the higher is consumption in this extended lifetime, or, in other words, the higher is 
income. Additionally, the moment of mortality reductions is important because 
competing risks vary along the lifecycle and mortality reductions far off in the future are   9
discounted at higher rates (on competing risks, see Dow, Philipson, and Sala-i-Martin, 
1999). 
Expression (7) will be used to evaluate the welfare gains from reductions in 
violent deaths for an individual at age a. With this expression in hand, the social value 
can be obtained by integrating MWPa through all ages, weighting the value at each age by 
the respective population, according to equation (6). 
 
2.2 Parameterization and Calibration 
  In the specification of the functional form for the instantaneous utility function 
u(.) and the calibration of the model, we follow closely the strategy of Becker, Philipson, 
and Soares (2004). 
  There are two dimensions of the instantaneous utility function u(
.) that are 
relevant for the analysis of changes in survival probabilities: the substitutability of 
consumption in different periods of life  (inter-temporal elasticity of substitution), and the 
value of being alive relative to being dead. Rosen (1988, p.287) stresses the importance 
of this last factor as a consequence of the normalization of utility in the death state to 
zero. 
  Unless one is willing to take first order linear approximations of the utility 
function, this means that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution cannot possibly 
contain enough information to calibrate all the relevant dimensions of choice involved in 
the problem. In our case, since we are dealing with extremely large differences in income 
across countries, a first order linear approximation does not seem adequate. Therefore, 
we follow Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2004) and assume the following functional 
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where α is the parameter that arises from the normalization of utility in the death state to 
zero, and γ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Note that, contrary to the 
superficial intuition, it is not true that α is necessarily positive. Strictly, α is the   10
parameter determining the level of annual consumption at which the individual would be 
indifferent between being dead or alive. If we think that there is such a level of 
consumption, γ larger than one necessarily means α smaller than zero. 
We assume that preferences towards consumption and survival rates are the same 
across different cultures, so that α and γ are underlying parameters shared by all the 
economies in our sample. So we can calibrate the values of α and γ using data from one 
country, and use them to value changes in survival rates in other countries. 
Two pieces of information, available in the literature for the US, are enough to 
fully calibrate the instantaneous utility function: the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution and the consumption elasticity of the instantaneous utility function. Define ε 





















,          ( 9 )  
 













1 1 / 1 1 c . 
  The value of ε can be estimated from compensating differentials for occupational 
mortality risks. Murphy and Topel (2003), using numbers from the literature on 
occupational risks, estimate ε to be 0.35. As noted by Cohen (1990), the risk of a violent 
death is not much different from the probability of death in a work-related accident. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that these estimates refer to the same parameter 
that we would want when evaluating changes in mortality due to violence reductions. 
In relation to the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, a wide range of values is 
available in the empirical literature. Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999, p.614), 
after exhaustively reviewing the estimates, suggest that the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution for non-durables is probably slightly above 1. 
We use γ = 1.25, ε  = 0.346 and c = 26,365 to calibrate the value of α. The value 
of consumption is the value of US per capita income in 1990 in the Penn World Tables 
version 6.1 (PWT 6.1) dataset. We use this value because Murphy and Topel (2003)   11
estimate ε using US data for 1990, and our income data comes from the PWT 6.1. Our 
calculations give a value of α equal to –16.16. Together with the value of γ, this implies 
that an individual with annual income equal to 353 would be indifferent between being 
alive or dead.
2 
Notice that the functional form adopted is flexible enough to accommodate an 
income-elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay that actually changes with income. 
So the calibration using US data is not limiting in the sense of imposing an income-
elasticity that does not belong to the less-developed countries we want to analyze. For 
average levels of income per capita, around $10,000, our calibrated parameters imply an 
income-elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay ((∂MWP/∂y)/(MWP/y)) around 1.2. 
But our specification allows this elasticity to vary with the income level, so that it reaches 
very high values for low income per capita. For example, it reaches 1.9 and 3.8 for, 
respectively, $1,000 and $500 of income per capita. Therefore, the functional form 
adopted is flexible enough to identify underlying preference parameters that, in principle, 
can be used irrespectively of the income level. 
Viscusi and Aldi (2003) make an extensive review of estimates of the “value of a 
statistical life” around the world. For the countries that are included both in our sample 
and in their review – Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong, UK, and US – our 
parameterization implies “values of a statistical life” between $1.6 and $2.6 million. 
These are typically in the lower range of estimates discussed in Viscusi and Aldi (2003). 
If anything, our parameterization will tend to underestimate the value of reductions in 
mortality and, therefore, the welfare cost of violence. 
With the values of α and γ in hand, we can use equation (7) to value the mortality 
reductions that would be observed if violent deaths were reduced to zero. This does not 
imply that the goal of public policy should be to reduce violence rates to zero. It does not 
even require that such goal be actually feasible. The meaning of the exercise is just that, 
in order to calculate the welfare cost of violence, one should compare the situation 
observed in the presence of violence with what would be observed in its absence. These 
will determine the potential benefits from violence reductions or, alternatively, the 
                                                 
2 The lowest value of the GDP per capita in our sample is 1153 (Tajikistan). In the entire PWT 6.1 dataset, 
the only values of the RGDPTT variable (GDP adjusted for terms of trade) below 353 are the ones for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo between 1994 and 1997.   12
welfare cost of the observed violence levels. What is feasible or not constitutes the other 
side of the equation, and will depend on the technology available and on the 
implementation costs of specific policies. 
With the assumptions made up to now, expression (7) can be rewritten in terms of 
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We set interest rates equal to 3% per year in the calculations. Notice that the 
actual discount applied to the individual problem will be higher than that, since it takes 
into account also the survival probabilities. Once expression (10) is used to calculate the 
marginal willingness to pay for individuals at each age a in a given country, we can use 
the age distribution of the population and equation (6) to calculate the social value of 
violence reductions. 
 
3 Data and Empirical Implementation 
 
  Age specific population and number of deaths are available from the World 
Health Organization Mortality Database.
4 We define violent deaths as deaths caused by 
“homicide and injury purposely inflicted by other persons, and other violence,” which 
correspond to the aggregate causes of death B55 and B56 in the International Code of 
Diseases 9 (ICD-9).
5 The income variable used is real GDP per capita adjusted for terms 
of trade, in 1996 international prices. This is the RDPTT variable from the PWT 6.1 
database. In order to increase the number of countries in the sample, all variables for 
                                                 
3 The formula used in the calculations is a discrete time version of (10). 
4 The WHO database contains data for each five-year age interval. To calculate life expectancy and survival 
probabilities, we assume constant mortality rates within these five-year intervals. 
5 The problem of underreporting of number of deaths is potentially serious. But the evidence discussed in 
Soares (2004) suggests that homicide rates behave in similar ways to crime rates obtained from 
victimization surveys. Therefore, reporting errors are likely to be random. At any rate, the worst case 
scenario – with high underreporting, correlated with income – would tend to diminish the value of violence 
reduction, and even more so for less developed countries. If  anything, our main results will be conservative 
estimates of the true value of violence reductions.   13
1995 are calculated as averages for the period between 1990 and 1999, or years available 
in this interval. All countries for which mortality data disaggregated by cause of death 
and age are available are included in the sample. This gives us 73 countries, listed in the 
Appendix. 
  We calculate the changes in survival probabilities brought about by reductions in 
violence in the following way. By definition, the survival probability between ages t and  
t + 1 can be calculated as
6 
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where  N(t+1,t) is the number of deaths between ages t and t+1, and P(t+1,t) is the 
population between ages t and t+1. The counterfactual survival probabilities in the 
absence of violence are simulated as: 
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where NV(t+1,t) is the number of deaths caused by violence between ages t and t+1 
(aggregate causes B55 and B56 in ICD-9), and SNV(t+1,t) is the “no-violence” survival 
rate between ages t and t+1. This rate gives the survival probability that would be 
observed between ages t and t + 1 if no deaths caused by violence were registered. This 
formulation assumes that an individual dying because of violence in a given year would 
not have died from any other cause otherwise.
7  
                                                 
6 We switch to a discrete setting for ease of exposition. 
7 This corresponds to assuming that deaths by violence are realized in the end of each period, after deaths 
from other causes were already realized. Alternatively, one could assume that deaths by violence are 
realized in the beginning of the period, before mortality from other causes is realized. In this case, the 
counterfactual scenario would have to take into account that the deaths that did not happen due to violence 
should be subject to the observed mortality rates from other causes. Since most of the violent deaths take 
place at ages when mortality from other causes is very low (prime-age), the difference between the two 
alternative hypotheses should be small.   14
  These single-period survival probabilities can be immediately transformed into 
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t SNV LNV . With the cumulative survival probabilities in hand, the 
counterfactual changes in survival probabilities that would be brought about by the 
elimination of violence are simulated as 
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 Finally,  Sv(t,a) allows us to calculate an interesting descriptive statistic, which 
will be discussed in the next section: the expected years of life lost to violence. Since life 
expectancy at birth is simply the integral of S(t,0) from zero to infinity, expected years of 
life lost to violence can be defined as: 
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which is simply the difference that arises when life expectancy is calculated using, 
respectively, the SNV(t,0) and the S(t,0) survival functions. It is the reduction in life 
expectancy caused by violence. 
  Sv(t,a) is used, together with equations (6) and (7), to estimate the individual 
willingness to pay and the lifetime aggregate social value of violence reductions in the 73 




  Tables 1 and 2 present the results of our exercise. The value of violence 
reductions is presented as the marginal willingness to pay of an 18 year-old individual,   15
and as the lifetime aggregate social value (both in level and percentage of GDP). 
Additionally, both tables present some statistics that will be helpful in our discussion: life 
expectancy at birth, homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), GDP per capita, the life 
expectancy that would be observed in the absence of violence, and the expected years of 
life lost to violence. Table 1 presents the results for the World Health Organization 
regions (some of them divided into sub-regions): Latin America and the Caribbean, North 
America, Western Europe, Former Communist Europe, and Western Pacific.
8 Table 2 
presents the results for each individual country. 
  From a descriptive perspective, Tables 1 and 2 contain some interesting numbers. 
First, the expected years of life lost to violence highlight a point that is already clear from 
the homicide rates. But this counterfactual variable is particularly interesting because it 
materializes the content of violence rates in a more concrete way. Our calculations show 
that, in 1995, individuals born in Latin America and Former Communist Europe had life 
expectancies, respectively, 0.6 and 0.4 year lower because of violence. These numbers 
are at least two times higher than the loss in life expectancy for any other region. Among 
the countries analyzed, violence is a much more serious mortality issue in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. This problem reaches its peak in Colombia, where 2.2 expected 
years of life are lost because of violence. Following, we have El Salvador, the 
Philippines, the Russian Federation and Chile, all of which have more than 0.9 year of 
life expectancy lost to violence.  
  But our main interest here is on the value of potential reductions in violence levels 
and, as discussed in section 2, mortality is not the only relevant dimension. Income will 
also play a major role. In this matter, the first thing to come out of Table 1 is that, no 
matter how you look at it, the value of violence reductions is quite high. For an 18 year-
old individual (MWP18), the marginal willingness to pay for eliminating violent deaths 
picks at values above $7,000, for Colombia, the Bahamas, and the US. These three cases 
illustrate the forces at work in determining willingness to pay: income and mortality. In 
terms of regions, North America has the highest value for MWP18 ($4,389), due to the 
highest income per capita in the sample and homicide rates that, though not too high, are 
                                                 
8 Regional numbers are non-weighted country averages. Due to data availability, the only African country 
included in the sample is Mauritius, and the only Eastern Mediterranean country is Kuwait. Therefore, 
these regions are not included in the regional table. Values for these two countries are contained in Table 2.   16
above the ones observed in other developed countries. As a result of the dominance of the 
income effect, the willingness to pay is the highest among all regions. The case of Latin 
America, with MWP18 equal to $2,941, is the mirror image of this: though income per 
capita is the second lowest in the sample, homicide rates are so high that the willingness 
to pay for violence reduction is the second highest among all regions. 
The role of income and life expectancy lost to violence in determining the 
marginal willingness to pay is illustrated Table 3.
9 This table presents the results of a 
linear regression of MWP18 on the natural logarithm of income and years of life lost to 
violence. The estimated coefficients imply that a 100% increase in income per capita is 
associated with a $1,393 increase in MWP18, while one additional year of life expectancy 
lost to violence increases MWP18 by $4,637.  
  To analyze the social aspect of welfare gains, it is interesting to look at the 
lifetime social value of violence reduction as a share of national output (aggregate GDP). 
This gives an idea of the relative importance of the effects of violence on lifetime 
welfare, when compared to the annual value of production. From this perspective, Latin 
American countries are on the front of the line. The value of reducing violence rates to 
zero for Latin American countries amounts to, on average, 27% of the 1995 GDP. This 
value is almost two times higher than the second highest regional value (15% for Former 
Communist Europe). Figure 1 shows the social value of violence reduction as a share of 
GDP for all countries in the sample, ordered from highest to lowest. The 6 frontrunners 
are either Latin American or Former Communist countries: Colombia, with an astounding 
100%, followed by El Salvador (53%), Russian Federation (44%), Chile (42%), 
Kazakhstan (40%), and Brazil (38%). Among the 10 highest values, 7 are from Latin 
American or the Caribbean, 2 are from Eastern Europe, and the remaining one is the 
Philippines. In the other extreme of the distribution, the 6 lowest values are from Western 
Europe.
10 
                                                 
9 There is no accepted knowledge on the relation between income and crime rates in the literature, though 
recent evidence seems to suggest that it is either mildly negative or nonexistent (see Fajnzylber et al, 2002a 
and 2002b, and Soares, 2004). 
10 The US constitutes an interesting case to check the consistency of our results, given the abounding 
evidence related to the welfare cost of violence from a series of different sources. In particular, our results 
are consistent with the evidence from the recent contingent-valuation literature. For example, Ludwig and 
Cook (2001) estimate that the social gain from reducing all types of gun violence (including non-lethal) by 
30% would be of the order US$24.5 billion per year. A back of the envelope calculation gives that the total   17
  When analyzing the values as shares of income, the dominant dimension is 
mortality. Figure 2 plots the expected years of life lost to violence against the social value 
of violence reduction (as a percentage of GDP), and fits a regression line to the relation. 
The close relation between the two variables is clear: the coefficient on years of life lost 
is positive and statistically significant, and the R
2 is 0.98.
11 When the willingness to pay 
is divided by income, the cost of violence has an almost linear relation with the loss in 
life expectancy. The estimated coefficient implies that one additional year of life lost to 
violence increases the social willingness to pay for violence eradication by 44% of the 
GDP. The close relationship portrayed in Figure 2 suggests a very simple rule of thumb: x 
years of life expectancy lost to violence increase the lifetime social cost of violence by 
x*44% of yearly production. 
  Another interesting dimension of the analysis is the age profile of the willingness 
to pay within a given country. Figures 3 (a) to (d) plot this profile between ages zero and 
70 for selected countries. Since we abstracted from income variations through the 
                                                                                                                                                 
welfare loss of gun related violence corresponds to US$81.7 billion per year. Discounted at the interest and 
mortality rates used here, this gives a lifetime present value equal to 25% of the 2000 aggregate GDP. This 
percentage is almost two times higher than the one that we obtain for the US (13%), but this should be no 
surprise, since the contingent-valuation methodology implicitly estimates all direct and indirect costs of 
violence, and also the costs of non-fatal injuries. Cohen et al (2004), using a similar methodology, estimate 
the costs of all types of crimes in the US – burglary, armed robbery, serious assault, rape and sexual assault, 
and murder – to correspond to US$625 billion per year. This gives a lifetime discounted value one order of 
magnitude higher than before (189% of the 2000 aggregate). Mainly due to availability of international 
data, our analysis is restricted to violence resulting in death, and it does not incorporate the direct material 
costs of crime. Nevertheless, these numbers suggest that, if anything, we are probably underestimating the 
welfare cost of violence. 
11 Note that this regression does not have a perfect fit only because of the non-linear relation between 
marginal willingness to pay and income, and the fact that, in the calculation of years of life lost, future 
gains in survival rates are not discounted at rate r. If we ignored the constant α and assumed a constant 
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) 0 , ( dt t Sv . We could arrive at a concept similar to the one captured by this regression analytically, by 
taking the derivative of the MWP18 and evaluating it at some convenient point. But there is no one to one 
relation between the expected years of life lost and the discounted change in the survival function, which 
appears in the marginal willingness to pay expression. Therefore, the exercise would be more complicated 
and less intuitively appealing. A similar comment applies to the results presented in Table 3. The regression 
does not have a perfect fit only because the relation between the two independent variables and the 
dependent variable in equation (10) is not linear. These linear regressions should be seen simply as 
descriptive tools.   18
lifecycle, this reflects only the distribution of violence and overall mortality across the 
different ages (the latter is important because it affects the horizon of the individual 
problem, and also because competing risks affect the value of mortality reductions at any 
given age).  
  A common feature of the age profile of willingness to pay in all different regions 
is the initially increasing portion – up to some age between 15 and 20 – followed by a 
constantly declining trend until the end of life. By age 70, the willingness to pay is quite 
small in all cases. 
  The overall age profile of the willingness to pay is determined by two factors. 
First, higher life expectancy conditional on survival increases the willingness to pay, and 
more so if consumption in the extended lifetime is higher. Therefore, everything else 
constant, younger individuals have a larger willingness to pay than older individuals, and 
this differential is increasing in the income level.
12 Second, future gains are discounted at 
the rate of interest, and gains past the individual’s age have no value whatsoever. 
Therefore, everything else constant, the willingness to pay tends to rise just before large 
changes in mortality, and drop after that. The interaction of these two dimensions, 
together with the age distribution of violent deaths, determines the age profile of the 
willingness to pay for different countries. 
Reductions in mortality at early ages are very valuable because the number of 
years to be enjoyed conditional on survival is very high. In addition, the value attached to 
these added years increases with income. This is the reason why initial willingness to pay 
tends to be relatively high on the first years of life, and even more so for rich countries. 
Additionally, as ages subject to significant mortality due to violence (prime-ages) 
approach, the willingness to pay tends to rise, since the gains become more immediate. 
As these ages are surpassed, both the reduced horizon, and the fact that part of the 
mortality reductions are already past the individual’s age, work towards reducing the 
willingness to pay. 
The top five countries in terms of the willingness to pay at age zero (MWP0) are 
Bahamas, United States, Colombia, Puerto Rico, and the Russian Federation. But the 
                                                 
12  Lifecycle issues might change this result depending on the periods when individuals accumulate or 
deplete wealth.   19
dimension of violence most connected to the economic aspect of crime – as it relates to 
inequality, urbanization, etc – reveals itself at later ages. Violent deaths between ages 15 
and 50 are the ones thought to be related to common crimes and generalized violence. 
When we move in the age distribution to young adulthood, we see that violence rates 
indeed take over the income effect, and become relatively more important in determining 
the willingness to pay. For example, already by age 18, the highest willingness to pay for 
violence reductions in the sample is observed in Colombia (even in absolute values). In 
Figure 3(a), we see that Argentina and Brazil start at age zero with a willingness to pay 
smaller than the Colombian, and that this gap is amplified until age 20. Colombia’s 
willingness to pay for violence reduction remains the highest among the three up to age 
60, even though Colombia’s income per capita is the lowest one. 
Figure 3(b) shows a similar pattern among Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: 
Russia – the highest homicide rate among the three – starts at age zero with the highest 
willingness to pay for violence reductions, and this difference is amplified until the early 
20’s; Russia remains with the highest values for MWPa up to age 70. But note that 
Russia’s per capita income is the highest among the three, so that the pattern here does 
not arise purely because of the differences in violence rates. 
Finally, Figures 3(c) and 3(d) illustrate a striking point: for every single age up to 
the 60’s, the welfare cost of violence in the United States is much higher than in any 
other developed country. This arises from the fact the US is the second richest country in 
the sample and, among the developed countries, the one with the second highest 
homicide rate (behind Portugal only). As should be clear by now, the interaction of these 
two factors generates a very large willingness to pay for reductions in violence. Figure 
3(d) also highlights the fact that Western European and East Asian countries have very 
low violence levels. The magnitudes of the willingness to pay in Italy, Japan and Spain 
are not only much lower than the ones observed in the other graphs in Figure 3, but also 
their age profile is much less pronounced. 
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5 Inequalities in Income and Exposure to Risk 
 
  The main limitation of the methodology applied here is the implicit assumption 
that both income and victimization are equally distributed across a country’s population. 
This would not be a serious problem if victimization were uncorrelated with income, in 
which case our estimates would have a zero mean error. But evidence shows that this is 
not the case. Victimization rates of different crimes are typically correlated with income, 
sometimes positively and sometimes negatively (for example, see Levitt, 1999 for a 
discussion on the US, and Gaviria and Vélez, 2002 for a discussion on Colombia). 
  There are several different dimensions over which this takes place. Usually, 
income and victimization rates are higher for men than for women and for adults than for 
children or older individuals. Alternatively, in terms of violent deaths, victimization is 
typically higher for individuals of lower socioeconomic status, which have lower income. 
To some extent, this same criticism applies whenever the “value of life” methodology is 
used in other contexts to evaluate the welfare impact of reductions in mortality, as long as 
the reductions are correlated with income.
13 
  In order to fully address this issue, we would need, for every country in the 
sample, income and death rates by age and cause of death, for every group that might be 
relevant for the analysis (men and women, black and white, rich and poor, etc). These 
data are very difficult to obtain, and an effort to collect all the required information is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, in order to assess the impact of our 
homogeneity assumptions, we concentrate in the dimension that is most serious for our 
analysis and use one specific example to evaluate the potential extent of the induced bias. 
  Whenever income and victimization are positively correlated in the population, 
our estimates of the willingness to pay for violence reductions will be biased downwards. 
This is true simply because the willingness to pay increases with income. So, if we 
incorporated considerations about the lifecycle profile of income or about gender 
differences in income and victimization, our estimates would be increased. Therefore, in 
                                                 
13 For example, when using the “value of life” methodology to analyze the economic value of medical 
research, Murphy and Topel (2003) incorporate mortality and income differences between men and 
women, and also differences across the lifecycle. But they do not consider the correlations between 
mortality and income across different socioeconomic groups.    21
this dimension, our results are conservative estimates of the true mortality costs of 
violence. And since our main point is that these results are already quite expressive as 
they are, this is not much of a concern. 
  But there is one specific dimension of heterogeneity in which our numbers are 
probably biased upwards. In respect to socioeconomic status, homicide victimization is 
typically concentrated in the lower strata of the population. In this case, by incorporating 
heterogeneity in income and victimization, we would probably obtain numbers smaller 
than the ones portrayed in Tables 1 and 2. As an exploratory effort, we look at the case of 
Brazil to asses how serious this bias may be. Our goal is to evaluate the effect of 
inequalities in income and risk exposure across different socioeconomic strata on the 
estimation of the welfare cost of violence.  
  Brazil has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, with the 
20% richest fraction of the population earning more than 30 times the income of the 20% 
poorest fraction. At the same time, Brazilian homicide rates are above 30 per 100,000 
inhabitants, being also among the highest in the world. 
  Though there is no data on number of deaths by income groups, the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health does release statistics on number of violent deaths by educational 
level (same cause of death groups as in the World Health Organization; the database is 
the DATASUS, from the Brazilian Ministry of Health).
 There are four educational levels 
contained in the data, corresponding to four different stages of the Brazilian educational 
system (see Blom, Holm-Nielsen, and Verner, 2000). We use these educational levels as 
proxies for different socioeconomic strata, and translate them into the American system 
according to the following classification: “No Education” (0 years of schooling), “Some 
Elementary” education (between 1 and 8 years of schooling), “Some High-School” 
(between 9 and 11 years of schooling), and “Some College” (more than 11 years of 
schooling).
14 
                                                 
14  The three educational categories following “No Education” correspond to “Ensino Fundamental,” 
“Ensino Secundário” and “Ensino Superior” in the Brazilian system. This is far from the ideal dataset, for a 
number of reasons. First, in almost 50% of the deaths, the educational level is not reported. Second, even if 
the reporting rate was higher, the information contained is not exactly what we need, since the educational 
level reported is the one of the victim herself. So, for example, the death of a 10 year-old individual will 
never be reported as belonging to the “Some College” group, even if the individual belonged to the highest 
socioeconomic group. This is a limitation imposed by the fact that we are using individual educational level 
to match socioeconomic status. It is not clear what the final effect of these biases will be. In any case, there   22
  Income per capita within each educational group is calculated by using average 
wage differentials across educational groups, and the distribution of the population is 
simulated according to the distribution of the Brazilian labor force. Menezes-Filho (2001) 
presents wage differentials and the educational distribution of the labor force for Brazil in 
1997. We use the distribution of the labor force, rather than population, because we want 
a picture of the distribution of completed years of schooling, and how it relates to the 
average income levels of the different socioeconomic groups.  
  Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the different educational groups in 
Brazil, once the assumptions discussed above are used to construct homicide rates, 
incomes, and population shares. Homicide victimization is largely concentrated among 
the less educated/poorer population. Homicide rates within the group with “Some 
Elementary” education are more than 8 times higher than homicide rates among people 
with “Some College.” At the same time, people with “Some College” earn, on average, 5 
times more than people with “Some Elementary” education. Since the elasticity of MWP 
in relation to income is above unit, these systematic differences may have a significant 
impact on the social willingness to pay for violence reductions. 
  We apply the same methodology outlined before to the four different educational 
groups in Brazil. By doing that, we obtain the social cost of violence for each educational 
group and, aggregating the total value, we obtain the social cost of violence in Brazil, 
once income and victimization inequalities are taken into account. For the exercise to be 
feasible, we assume that mortality by the other underlying causes of death is the same 
across the different educational groups, and only mortality caused by violence differs. 
Therefore, life expectancy in the no-violence scenario will be the same across the 
different educational groups (and the same as it was in our previous calculations, 69.8), 
but life expectancy in the presence of violence will be different. 
  With these assumptions, and data from Table 4, we obtain the results presented in 
Table 5. Most of the burden of violence falls on the population with “Some Elementary” 
education. This fraction represents 35% of the Brazilian population and is likely to 
contain most of the urban poor. They loose 1.8 years of life expectancy at birth due to 
                                                                                                                                                 
is nothing we can do in this respect. As a positive note, the victimization profile described in Table 4 seems 
to be in line with the available evidence for Brazil.   23
violent deaths, and their willingness to pay for violence reduction corresponds to 14.6% 
of the aggregate Brazilian GDP in 1995. 
  The “No Education” group has very low income and, therefore, its willingness to 
pay is quantitatively very small, even though its population is exposed to very high 
homicide rates. In the other extreme, the groups with “Some High School” and “Some 
College” have higher income, but are exposed to lower violence levels and are smaller in 
size. Therefore, their aggregate willingness to pay is also quantitatively modest. 
  The age specific willingness to pay for the different educational groups is 
presented in Figure 4. Though willingness to pay at earlier ages is highest for the group 
subject to the highest violence levels, by age 25 the income effect already dominates and 
individuals from the group with “Some College” become the ones with the highest 
values. This also reflects the fact that violence levels tend to peak at earlier ages for the 
group with “Some Elementary” education, as compared to the group with “Some 
College.” This may be due to the bias discussed in the last footnote and requires further 
investigation. But it may also indicate that part of the victimization of the low income 
group (“Some Elementary”) is related to the early involvement of some of its members in 
criminal activities, while the victimization of the high income group (“Some College”) is 
related to the fact that it is an attractive target for criminals. 
  But the most important information contained in Table 5 is the aggregate social 
cost of violence, once inequalities in income and victimization are taken into account. In 
this case, the social cost of violence is estimated to be 24% of the 1995 GDP, as opposed 
to the 38% estimated before. The estimated social cost is reduced by 37% of its initial 
value once inequalities are taken into account. 
This arises because of the negative correlation between income and victimization 
present in the Brazilian data, and the elasticity of the willingness to pay in relation to 
income. As compared to the estimations assuming a homogenous population, 
victimization rates are “redistributed” towards the fractions of the population with lowest 
willingness to pay, and this diminishes the aggregate value of violence reductions. The 
extent of the reduction is explained by the extreme degree of inequality observed in 
Brazilian society.   24
Though the exercise indicates that inequalities in income and risk exposure may 
have significant effects on the social willingness to pay for violence reductions, there are 
two points worth mentioning here. First, the order of magnitude of the estimates is not 
changed. After accounting for inequality, the welfare cost of violence is still very high. 
Second, the effect of inequality is likely to be among the highest in the case of Brazil, 
because of the extremely high degree of income inequality and the high levels of 
violence. In this sense, the 37% bias estimated in this section is likely to be an upper 
bound to what can happen in other countries. Even discounting for that, the estimated 
welfare cost of violence is still very large. 
  
6 Concluding Remarks 
 
  This paper presents the first comprehensive cross-country assessment of the 
importance of non-monetary costs of violence. Our results show that, for the 73 countries 
included in the sample, reducing violence rates to zero would imply an average increase 
of 1/3 of a year in life expectancy at birth, and would have a lifetime value corresponding 
to, on average, 15% of the 1995 GDP. For Colombia and the United States, violence 
reduces life expectancy at birth by, respectively, 2.2 and 0.3 years. These declines in life 
expectancy represent social welfare losses of the order of 13% of the 1995 GDP for the 
US, and 100% for Colombia. Generally, a one-unit increase in years of life lost to 
violence is associated with an increase of 44% of the GDP in the social willingness to pay 
for violence reductions. 
These numbers should be compared to the present discounted value of the annual 
flow of material costs of crime. Material costs of the order of 2.1% of the GDP per year 
for the US correspond to a lifetime present value of 62% of the GDP. Material costs of 
the order of 3.6% of the GDP per year for Latin America correspond to a present 
discounted value of roughly 100% of the GDP.
15 Our results would increase the current 
estimates of the costs of crime and violence by roughly 25%. In addition, these estimated 
material costs include expenditures, among others, on police force, penitentiaries, and 
judicial system, all of which are in place in order to reduce the risk of victimization of the 
                                                 
15 The discount rate applied here also accounts for survival probabilities.   25
general population. If public policy is efficiently designed, the welfare benefits from 
having such institutions in place should be at least as large as the observed costs. 
Alternatively, our estimates give potential benefits from further reductions in 
violence. These do not mean that additional expenditures on public safety should 
necessarily be undertaken. Whether these additional expenditures are worthwhile depends 
on the public safety technology available, and on its implementation costs. Or, in other 
words, it depends on whether further reductions in violence can be achieved at a cost 
lower than the social willingness to pay.  
  It is also important to stress precisely what our estimates measure. The 
identification of the underlying parameters that allows the valuation of changes in 
survival probabilities comes from the value of life literature, via compensating 
differentials for occupational mortality risks. As long as mortality rates and the 
probability of injuries are correlated across different occupations, the estimation of the 
relevant parameters may partially capture the willingness to pay for reductions in the 
probability of injuries. Therefore, by using these parameters, we are probably also 
valuing, to some extent, certain reductions in “injury rates” that may accompany 
reductions in homicides (assuming a correlation between homicides and injuries similar 
to the correlation between occupational mortality risks and probability of work-related 
injuries). Nevertheless, there is a large share of non-monetary costs due to injuries and 
other aspects of violence – sexual violence, for example – that is clearly not captured by 
the correlation between death and injury implicit in the estimation from occupational 
risks. From this perspective, if anything, our results probably underestimate the true 
social value of violence reductions. 
  Also, we do not discuss the indirect economic effects of the violence-induced 
reduction in life expectancy, or the other inefficiencies associated with crime. These may 
include loss in utility from changed behavior, decreased investments in human capital 
and health, reduced savings and investments in physical capital (higher discount rates), 
and, therefore, reduced long-run growth.  
  Even so, the estimated social value of investments in security and policies aimed 
at reducing violence is quite large. We do not think that these non-monetary costs of   26
violence and crime are taken seriously enough into account in the discussion and 





A.1 Countries Included in the Sample 
 
Albania; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Barbados; 
Belarus; Belgium; Belize; brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; 
Croatia; Cuba; Czech Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; 
Germany; Greece; Grenada; Hong Kong; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; 
kazaks tan; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia; Malta; 
Mauritius; Mexico; Netherlands; new Zealand; Norway; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; 
Puerto rice; republic of Korea; republic of Moldova; Romania; Russian federation; saint 
kits and Nevis; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Suriname; Sweden; 
Tajikistan; Trinidad and Tobago; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; united kingdom; United States; 





Income per capita: RGDPTT from the Penn World Tables version 6.1. Real GDP per 
capita adjusted for terms of trade, in 1996 international prices. The value for 1995 is the 
average for all years available between 1990 and 1999. 
 
Homicide Rates,  Survival Probabilities, and Counterfactual Survival Probabilities: 
Calculated from the World Health Organization Mortality Database, using number of 
deaths, number of deaths caused by “homicide and injury purposely inflicted by other 
persons, and other violence” (aggregate causes of death B55 and B56 in the ICD-9), and 
population, all by age group. The value for 1995 is the average for all years available 
between 1990 and 1999. 
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Marg Will to Pay 
of an 18 Year-old
Social Value 
(billions)
Social Value as 
% of Agg GDP
Latin America & Caribbean 71.4 21.8 7,708          72.0 0.6 2,941                      43.07                  27%
North America 76.1 6.5 25,672        76.3 0.2 4,389                      496.61                8%
Western Europe 76.2 4.0 19,532        76.3 0.1 1,383                      17.62                  5%
Former Communist Europe 68.9 17.2 6,009          69.2 0.4 1,435                      29.16                  15%
Western Pacific  76.0 7.8 17,839        76.3 0.2 1,368                      32.95                  9%
Notes: * Regional numbers are unweightedcountry averages. Due to data availability,the only African country includedin the sample is Mauritius, and the only Eastern Mediterraneancountry is Kuwait. Therefore, these regions
are not included in this table. Values for these two countries are contained in Table 2.
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% of Agg. GDP
ALBANIA 73.6 14.2 2,573          74.0 0.40 527                         1.07 13%
ARGENTINA 71.9 15.8 9,938          72.3 0.41 2,633                      61.66 18%
ARMENIA 72.0 13.8 2,486          72.3 0.34 409                         1.08 12%
AUSTRALIA 77.4 2.6 22,047        77.5 0.08 1,284                      13.35 3%
AUSTRIA 76.0 1.9 21,099        76.1 0.05 717                         3.57 2%
AZERBAIJAN 69.2 22.2 2,288          69.7 0.59 683                         3.04 18%
BAHAMAS 70.4 24.7 16,527        71.0 0.63 7,836                      1.52 33%
BARBADOS 73.2 9.9 14,339        73.4 0.26 2,833                      0.44 12%
BELARUS 68.4 22.5 6,870          68.8 0.45 2,099                      14.28 20%
BELGIUM 75.6 4.5 21,025        75.7 0.11 1,702                      10.66 5%
BELIZE 73.8 8.6 6,131          74.1 0.29 929                         0.15 12%
BRAZIL* 69.0 34.4 6,591          69.8 0.83 3,912                      241.36 38%
BULGARIA 70.2 6.2 6,263          70.3 0.13 534                         2.65 5%
CANADA 77.1 2.8 22,827        77.2 0.08 1,353                      23.68 4%
CHILE 73.2 33.5 8,116          74.1 0.91 4,375                      46.07 42%
COLOMBIA 71.2 83.2 5,249          73.5 2.23 7,872                      178.86 100%
COSTA RICA 74.7 7.8 5,247          74.9 0.23 708                         1.76 10%
CROATIA 71.2 31.4 7,838          72.0 0.80 4,930                      10.77 29%
CUBA 74.0 10.6 5,498          74.2 0.26 901                         6.13 10%
CZECH REPUBLIC 71.5 6.5 12,876        71.6 0.14 1,166                      8.03 6%
ECUADOR 71.2 15.5 3,691          71.7 0.46 985                         7.60 20%
EL SALVADOR 70.1 42.3 3,959          71.4 1.22 2,983                      11.22 53%
ESTONIA 68.0 26.4 7,771          68.6 0.56 3,187                      2.79 24%
FINLAND 75.3 7.2 19,423        75.5 0.18 2,631                      8.40 8%
FRANCE 77.3 5.2 20,299        77.4 0.13 1,854                      71.85 6%
GEORGIA 69.0 12.8 4,776          69.3 0.28 761                         2.18 11%
GERMANY 75.6 3.6 20,848        75.7 0.08 1,287                      64.45 4%
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Table 2: Value of Violence Reduction and Descriptive Statistics, Countries, 1995
GREECE 76.7 1.4 12,583        76.8 0.04 331                         2.04 2%
GRENADA 67.8 10.3 4,984          68.0 0.26 748                         0.05 12%
HONG KONG 77.8 3.3 24,556        77.9 0.09 1,452                      6.64 5%
HUNGARY 68.5 4.5 8,941          68.6 0.09 511                         3.51 4%
ICELAND 77.6 2.0 21,728        77.7 0.06 995                         0.18 3%
IRELAND 74.6 1.5 17,692        74.6 0.04 553                         1.26 2%
ISRAEL 76.4 6.5 15,534        76.6 0.17 1,843                      7.13 9%
ITALY 77.1 2.8 20,216        77.1 0.07 1,082                      36.04 3%
JAPAN 79.6 2.9 23,406        79.7 0.07 988                         97.07 3%
KAZAKSTAN 65.4 38.6 6,052          66.2 0.83 3,291                      39.32 40%
KUWAIT 74.9 3.3 23,386        75.0 0.10 1,743                      2.25 6%
KYRGYZSTAN 66.3 17.6 2,836          66.8 0.44 649                         2.35 18%
LATVIA 66.5 34.6 7,323          67.1 0.63 3,204                      5.45 29%
LITHUANIA 69.4 16.0 6,920          69.7 0.35 1,597                      3.90 15%
LUXEMBOURG 75.8 3.2 33,969        75.9 0.08 2,331                      0.54 4%
MACEDONIA 71.2 3.4 4,559          71.3 0.08 198                         0.27 3%
MALTA 76.0 2.7 13,101        76.1 0.07 787                         0.16 3%
MAURITIUS 69.2 2.5 11,145        69.3 0.06 465                         0.37 3%
MEXICO 71.2 20.8 7,630          71.8 0.59 3,103                      204.13 31%
NETHERLANDS 76.7 1.6 21,122        76.7 0.05 724                         6.18 2%
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NORWAY 76.5 1.6 23,515        76.5 0.04 803                         2.10 2%
PHILIPPINES 70.6 33.2 3,086          71.6 0.95 1,465                      77.86 37%
POLAND 70.8 8.3 7,277          71.0 0.17 813                         22.77 8%
PORTUGAL 73.8 13.3 13,434        74.1 0.29 2,472                      17.28 13%
PUERTO RICO 71.9 28.5 9,974          72.7 0.76 5,922                      11.77 33%
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 74.9 3.7 12,706        75.0 0.10 827                         27.72 5%
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 65.7 25.1 2,251          66.2 0.52 587                         1.56 17%
ROMANIA 68.6 4.6 4,629          68.7 0.10 261                         3.95 4%
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 65.8 49.9 7,918          66.7 0.94 5,488                      510.72 44%
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS 68.7 11.6 10,567        69.1 0.41 3,519                      0.11 23%
SINGAPORE 76.2 6.6 22,265        76.3 0.17 2,694                      6.20 9%
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 71.2 5.4 10,443        71.4 0.12 849                         3.17 6%
SLOVENIA 73.5 3.2 12,823        73.5 0.08 660                         0.87 3%
SPAIN 76.9 1.3 15,541        76.9 0.03 393                         9.53 2%
SURINAME 71.2 15.9 2,948          71.6 0.44 658                         0.20 17%
SWEDEN 77.5 6.6 20,788        77.7 0.16 2,534                      14.74 8%
TAJIKISTAN 66.3 15.9 1,153          66.8 0.48 190                         0.79 12%
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 69.6 12.3 9,514          70.0 0.31 2,176                      1.87 16%
TURKMENISTAN 64.5 8.8 4,533          64.7 0.22 632                         2.02 11%
UKRAINE 67.5 29.9 6,223          68.1 0.57 2,360                      77.33 24%
UNITED KINGDOM 75.8 4.6 19,650        75.9 0.12 1,862                      61.00 5%
UNITED STATES 75.0 10.2 28,517        75.3 0.31 7,426                      969.53 13%
URUGUAY 71.8 4.4 8,810          71.9 0.11 657                         1.32 5%
UZBEKISTAN 67.5 7.8 2,595          67.7 0.22 280                         5.02 9%
VENEZUELA 71.3 23.6 6,746          71.9 0.66 3,128                      42.14 30%
Notes: * The mortality data for Brazil refers only to the South, Southeast, and Central-West regions. GDP per capita figures used are for the whole country, and aggregate GDP is calculated by using the GDP per capita figure
and the region specific populations.Coeff Std Error t p-value
ln(GDP) 1,393 164 8.48 0.00
Lv 4,637 349 13.27 0.00
const -12,397 1560 -7.95 0.00
R
2
0.72 N Obs 73
Table 3: Effect of Income and Years of Life Lost to Violence on the 
Willingness to Pay of a Newborn (MWP 18)
Note: Dependent variable is Willingness to Pay of an 18 Year-old for Violence
Reductions; independent variables are natural logarithm of per capita GDP (RTTGDP






No Education 2,706 35.4 12%
Some Elementary 4,006 68.5 35%
Some High School 6,689 4.8 43%
Some College 20,469 8.1 10%
Note: Income per capita is GDP in 1996 international prices adjusted for terms of trade,
calculated using average educational wage differentials. Population shares are calculated using
shares of the labor force.




Marg Will to Pay 
of an 18 Year-old
Social Value 
(billions)
Social Value as % of 
Aggregate National GDP
No Education 68.7 1.1 1,341 11.6 1.8%
Some Elementary 68.0 1.8 4,498 94.2 14.6%
Some High School 69.7 0.1 673 17.8 2.8%
Some College 69.6 0.2 4,025 28.8 4.5%
152.4 23.7%
Table 5: Value of Violence Reduction by Educational Group, Brazil, 1995












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































countryFigure 2: Expected Years of Life Lost and Social Value of Violence Reduction (% of GDP), 1995
y = 0.4387x - 0.0009
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)Figure 3: Age Profile of the Willingness to Pay for Violence Reductions, Selected Countries, 1995



















































































































































































































No Educ Elementary High-School College